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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Joseph L. Krofcheck, appeals from an order 
that attempts to amend, nunc pro tunc, the prior judgment and Decree 
of Foreclosure dated March 4, 1974, herein. Said order purportedly 
granted further attorney fees and expenses to Plaintiff-Respondent 
covering proceedings, entertained subsequent to such foreclosure, 
in the Utah Supreme Court, The Appellant was at all times a non-
assuming grantee of the original mortgagor in said foreclosure 
action and proceedings in the Utah Supreme Court. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
Upon Plaintiff-Respondent's February 26, 1976, motion to amend 
the original Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure herein, the Third 
District Court in and for Summit County, Utah, entered its Order, 
nunc pro tunc, on March 17, 1976, which amended said original Judg-
ment and Decree of March 4, 1974, and awarded Plaintiff-Respondent 
the additional sum of the $5,621.98 as attorneys' fees and expenses 
incurred for resisting proceedings initiated by the Appellant, sub-
sequent to said final foreclosure decree, in the Utah Supreme Court. 
Said award was ordered disbursed to Plaintiff-Respondent from the 
funds that were on deposit with the Clerk constituting the excess 
monies realized from the Sheriff's Sale of Appellant's real property, 
under the subject mortgages, conducted on April 9, 1974. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT BY THIS APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order entered by the lower 
court which amended, nunc pro tunc, the final foreclosure Judgment 
and Decree of March 4, 1974, by awarding additional attorney fees 
and expenses to Respondent covering Appellant's prior appeal herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the year 1967, Respondent's predecessor, as seller, and 
Appellant's predecessor, as buyer, entered into an agreement for 
the sale and purchase of real property. Said buyer executed 
promissory notes secured by mortgages on the subject realty for 
the balance of the purchase price, after making a substantial cash 
down payment. 
Subsequently, Respondent succeeded to the seller's interest 
under said notes and mortgages, and Appellant succeeded to the 
interest of the buyer in the real property covered by the mortgages, 
but Appellant did not make an assumption of the obligations under 
said mortgage notes. 
Other entities, not parties to the instant proceeding, were 
made liable for the monetary obligations under said notes and 
mortgages by virtue of the lower court's final judgment in Civil 
No. 4143, in the year 1971, whereby certain defendants in such 
action, but not Appellant, were ordered to pay the same. 
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Respondent filed the above-entitled action to foreclose its 
subject mortgages, in May, 1972. At no time did Respondent per-
sonally serve the Appellant with summons but they purportedly 
effected service of summons by publication upon Appellant, a 
permanent California resident, during late 1973 and early 1974. 
On February 22, 1974, the clerk of the court below entered 
Appellant's default, and on March 4, 1974, said court entered its 
judgment and decree of foreclosure. 
On April 9, 1974, Appellant's real property as embraced by the 
Respondent's mortgages was sold at public auction and the Intervenors 
in this action were the successful bidders thereof. 
On October 4, 1974, Appellant filed a motion in the lower court 
to set aside his default and vacate the foreclosure decree and sale. 
Said motion was denied on March 3, 1975. 
Thereafter, Appellant appealed said order of March 3, 1975, 
to this Court pursuant to Utah Supreme Court number 14031. 
Appellant's said appeal, although unavailing, was meritorious 
and based, inter alia, upon a defective service of summons by 
publication. 
This Court affirmed the lower court's aforesaid March 3, 1975 
order pursuant to its decision in said Case Number 14031, dated 
January 26, 1976, and awarded "costs to plaintiff (respondent)". 
Further attorney fees or expenses herein were neither requested by 
Respondent nor rendered by this Court. 
-3-
It was after the foregoing proceedings were culminated that 
Respondent sought, through the nunc pro tunc order of March 17, 
1976 herein, to obtain its attorney fees and expenses from the 
court below as recited under "Disposition of Lower Court" in 
this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO EXERCISE ITS NUNC PRO TUNC 
POWERS ACCORDING TO LAW. 
When the lower court!s original March 4, 1974, foreclosure 
decree was entered several thousand dollars was allowed Respondent 
for attorney fees and costs. No_ provision was then made for ad-
ditional fees or costs. 
Thereafter, the lower court lost jurisdiction when Appellant 
took his first appeal herein and only costs were granted Respondent 
by the Utah Supreme Court as a result of said appeal. However, 
after the filing of the remittitur, the lower court attempted to 
change its prior original final order for attorney fees and costs, 
through the purported nunc pro tunc order complained of in this 
brief. 
These facts require application of the fundamental legal 
doctrine stated by these authorities: 
"....when a court exceeds its power in entering a 
purported nunc pro tunc order, the order is invalid. 
The function of an order nunc pro tunc is to record 
an order actually made, which, through some over-
sight or inadvertence, was never entered on the 
records of the court, or which was incorrectly 
entered. An order nunc pro tunc cannot do more 
than supply a record of something that was actually 
done at the time to which it is retroactive. Such 
entry may be made in order to save proceedings that 
have been had before it is made, but where no pro-
ceedings have been had and the jurisdiction of the 
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court over the subject has been withdrawn in the 
meantime, a court has no power to make a nunc pro 
tunc order. A nunc pro tunc amendment or correction 
of a court order is not proper to correct judicial 
errors or omissions or to change an order actually 
rendered. If the court has omitted to make an order 
that it might or ought to have made at a particular 
term, it cannot make the order nunc pro tunc after 
the term or at a subsequent term (citing cases from 
many jurisdictions)", (Emphasis added) 
56 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 37-38 
"On Appeal - Where allowance was made for attorney 
fees in foreclosure decree, which was affirmed on 
appeal, trial court could not subsequent to the 
filing therein of the remittitur allow additional 
attorney fees for services rendered in resisting 
appeal and thereupon enter a supplemental judgment 
whereby the additional amount allowed was incorp-
orated in, and became part of, original decree, 
since provisions of mortgage became merged in decree 
which governed rights of the parties, and decree 
containing no provision for additional attorney 
fees could not be allowed." (Emphasis added) 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages, Sect. 812, Page 1551, F.N. #75 
The Utah Code Annotated, Vol. 9 at page 336, cites the fore-
going rule as a "Collateral Reference" to Utah law: UCA, Sect. 78-37-9. 
The California jurisdiction appears to be a substantial basis 
for the aforesaid principles, where applied to the specific facts of 
Appellant's cause herein. The yery latest California case on the sub-
ject, repeats the rule in this June 18, 1969, decision: 
"After remittitur is filed, trial court has no 
authority to entertain a motion for counsel fees 
on appeal unless authority is conferred on it by 
the appellate court. Where no authority to hear 
and determine matter of attorney fees for services 
rendered on appeal had been conferred on trial 
court by Court of Appeal in its decision, or in 
remittitur, trial court was without jurisdiction 
after the judgment became final to hear plaintiff's 
motion for counsel fees on appeal." 
American City Bank v. Zetlen, (Calif. 1969) 
76 Cal. Rptr. 898. 
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Further to the foregoing, are these expressions from other 
jurisdictions: 
"Court's order awarding attorney fees for appeal 
was error where notes involved did not contain 
any clause concerning attorney fees on appeal". 
Lake KiHarney Apts. Inc. v. Estate of Thompson, 
(Fla. 1973) 283 So. 2nd 102. 
"Where contract between litigants specifically 
provided that prevailing party would be entitled 
to attorney fees in action but did not provide for 
attorney fees to either party on appeal, prevail-
ing party was not entitled to award of attorney 
fees on appeal." 
McMillan v. Golden, (Ore. 1972) 497 P.2nd 1166. 
The only Utah Supreme Court ruling on the subject, encountered 
by the undersigned, follows the legal principles hereinbefore 
outlined: 
"3. No attorney fee for trying the case in the 
Supreme Court is recoverable as costs ... As to 
the item charged as attorney fee, we know of no 
law authorizing its allowance for trials in this 
Court on appeal." 
Marks v. Culmer, 7 Utah 163, 25 P. 743. 
As to Respondent's contention that "equity" should permit re-
covery of their attorney fees and expenses on appeal, this Utah case 
states the doctrine of law which applies to the foreclosure decree 
herein: 
"Foreclosure is statutory ... must be conducted 
in accordance with the statutes." (Emphasis added). 
Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 
540; 144 P2nd 276 
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POINT II: RESPONDENT'S CLAIMS INVOLVE FEES AND COSTS ATTRIBUTABLE 
ONLY TO THE APPELLANT KROFCHECK, WHO CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE 
THEREFOR AS A NON-ASSUMING GRANTEE OF THE MORTGAGED REAL 
PROPERTY. 
The principal debtor which actually executed the subject notes 
and mortgages was the Major-Blakeney Corporation, Appellant's pre-
decessor twice removed. Said corporation was the mortgagor which 
agreed to pay a reasonable attorney's fee in the lower court (not 
on appeal). 
Appellant acquired the subject mortgaged realty from Park City 
Utah Corporation, the latter having purchased from Major-Blakeney 
Corporation, At no time did Appellant assume any of the obligations 
under the said notes and mortgages; nor did Appellant make the in-
stallment payments thereunder, since the lower court's final 1971 
judgment in Civil No. 4143 (Statement of Facts, supra.) required 
others to do so. 
However, only Appellant Krofcheck was involved in the legal pro-
ceedings incident to the appeal covered by Utah Supreme Court decision 
No. 14031, such appeal being the basis of Respondent's claims for 
additional attorney fees and expenses to resist said appeal; and, 
which sums were granted by the lower court pursuant to its nunc pro 
tunc order complained of herein. 
Appellant's said appeal centered around issues of improper notice 
to him of the original foreclosure action. Such effort was his con-
stitutional right, which is independent of the obligations embraced 
by the principal debtor under the mortgage instruments. 
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Appearing as a "Collateral Reference" under Sect. 78-37-9, 
of the Utah Code Annotated, is found this statement of the ap-
propriate rule covering the foregoing facts: 
"The general rule is to allow attorney fees 
against the principal debtor and against the 
land (res) which is the subject of litigation, 
and not. against other and incidental defendants... 
A. grantee assuming no liability under a_ mortgage 
is not liable for the mortgagee's attorney fee 
on foreclosure, nor may a simple indorser of 
notes, who does not sign the mortgage or trust 
deed, be held responsible for attorney fees 
(citing much authority)" (Emphasis added) 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages, Section 812, Page 1555 
Therefore, it was improper not only for the lower court to 
award fees and expenses, nunc pro tunc, against Appellant for his 
appeal, it was likewise error for that court to order such fees and 
expenses paid from Appellant's funds (the land had been already 
foreclosed and sold), then on deposit with the Clerk. 
DATED this fi^ day of June, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON R. STRONG, for appellant. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Served two copies of the foregoing brief upon counsel for 
Respondent, by mailing the same to the address set forth on the 
cover hereof, postage prepaid, this /$-—day of June, 1975. 
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